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Abstract. We introduce report and trace ring signature schemes, balanc-
ing the desire for signer anonymity with the ability to report malicious
behaviour and subsequently revoke anonymity. We contribute a formal
security model for report and trace ring signatures that incorporates
established properties of anonymity, unforgeability and traceability, and
captures a new notion of reporter anonymity. We present a construction
of a report and trace ring signature scheme, proving its security and
analysing its efficiency, comparing with the state of the art in the account-
able ring signatures literature. Our analysis demonstrates that our report
and trace scheme is efficient, particularly for the choice of cryptographic
primitives that we use to instantiate our construction.
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1 Introduction
Group signatures [8] and ring signatures [21] provide signers with anonymity
within a set of users. Anonymity is a sought-after property, yet, under certain
circumstances, it is also desirable to provide a guarantee of traceability, which
means that anonymity can be revoked. This presents an interesting problem: how
does a group or ring signature guarantee anonymity and traceability?
Group signatures rely on a trusted group manager to achieve these conflicting
aims. The group manager determines the members of the group and issues key
pairs to group members. Signers are anonymous within the group, but the group
manager can learn the identity of signers and revoke anonymity. On the other
hand, ring signatures do not rely on a trusted manager. In fact, signers generate
their key pairs and select the group of users, known as the ring, within which the
signer is anonymous. The solution to achieving anonymous and traceable ring
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signatures is accountable ring signatures [26, 6], which define a designated tracer
who can identify signers. Accountable ring signatures retain the versatility of
ring signatures, allowing signers to generate their keys and select the anonymity
ring, and additionally allow signer anonymity to be revoked.
In practice, to begin the tracing process, the designated tracer in an account-
able ring signature will often receive a report of malicious behaviour from a
reporter. However, the reporter is outside the scope of the syntax and secu-
rity model of accountable ring signatures. Consequently, it is implicit that the
tracer must be trusted not to revoke anonymity without first receiving a report.
Moreover, by omitting the role of the reporter from the security model, it is not
possible to make any formal statements about the privacy of the reporter.
To address this, we introduce report and trace ring signatures. The underlying
idea of report and trace is that a designated tracer can revoke anonymity of a
signer if and only if a report of malicious behaviour is made by a user. In other
words, a user reports a malicious message to the tracer, and the tracer must
receive a report to revoke anonymity of the signer. Accordingly, report and trace
achieves the balance between anonymity and traceability of accountable ring
signatures, ensuring that the anonymity of a signer is preserved until tracing is
complete. Additionally, report and trace incorporates a reporting system that
preserves the anonymity of the signer and the reporter.
1.1 Related Work
Group signatures were introduced in [8], and the first security models were
presented in [2, 3]. Generally, the group manager can revoke the anonymity of
a signer and must be trusted to preserve signer anonymity in the absence of
malicious behaviour. Several variants of group signatures have been proposed to
limit trust in the group manager. For example, accountable tracing signatures [16]
require that the group manager produce a proof of correct tracing and, if tracing
occurred, a proof denying tracing cannot be produced. Traceable signatures [15]
define a designated authority that can trace all signatures produced by a particular
signer if the group manager provides the authority with a tracing token for that
signer. Furthermore, group signatures with message dependent opening (MDO
signatures) [22] allow the group manager to revoke the anonymity of all signers
that produced a signature for a particular message if and only if a reporter first
produces a report related to that message. Our report and trace ring signature
provides a similar distributed tracing function, but, in our setting, the report is
attached to a signature rather than a message. Additionally, MDO signatures
define the reporter to be a fixed entity with a secret key generated during setup.
Report and trace ring signatures, on the other hand, model reporters as system
users, and our security model ensures anonymity of the reporter. Finally, we note
that report and trace is a variation of a ring signature and, as such, does not
rely upon a trusted group manager to issue key pairs to users and allows users
to select their anonymity ring.
Ring signatures were first formally defined in [21] and a security model was
presented in [4]. Following this, numerous variations of ring signatures have
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appeared (see, for example, [25] for a survey of some of these variations), a
number of which offer some notion of traceability. For instance, linkable [18] and
traceable [12] ring signatures provide limited tracing functionality, allowing two
signatures generated by the same signer to be linked. Moreover, accountable ring
signatures, introduced in [26] and formalised in [6], allow revocation of signer
anonymity by a designated tracer and are, as a result, most closely related to
our work. In fact, report and trace ring signatures can be viewed as an extension
of accountable ring signatures, where the role of the tracer is distributed and the
reporter is modelled as an anonymous system user.
A closely related line of work is purpose-built reporting systems [1, 17, 20].
Analogously to our work, these systems allow a user to report another user and
subsequently allow revocation of anonymity by a designated tracer. However,
unlike our report and trace scheme, these systems are stand-alone reporting
systems. Specifically, their design allows a user to identify an individual that has,
for example, harassed or assaulted the user, hiding the identity of the accused
and reporter until a threshold of reports related to the accused are submitted,
at which point a tracer reveals the identity of the accused and the reporter(s).
We note that, critically, these systems require a threshold of reports to revoke
anonymity of the accused. This design decision empowers reporters, allowing
them to submit accusations with the confidence that they will remain anonymous
unless (or until) a number of other reporters have come forward. Finally, in [24],
a report and trace scheme was introduced in the context of end-to-end encrypted
messaging. In such systems, a message receiver can report a malicious message
to a designated tracer, and the tracer can revoke anonymity of the sender. The
tracer learns nothing about the sender unless a report is provided by the recipient
of that message, and the identity of the reporter is revealed only to the tracer,
albeit the reporter’s identity is known to the tracer before tracing is complete.
1.2 Our Contributions
We define syntax and a security model for report and trace (R&T) ring signatures
(§2). Our syntax defines a reporting user who provides the tracer with a reporter
token, recovered from a signature, and a designated tracer who uses the reporter
token to revoke anonymity of the signer. Our security model extends the generic
definitions of correctness, anonymity and unforgeability for ring signatures defined
in [4] to capture ring signatures with a report and trace functionality. Furthermore,
we define traceability, adapting the security properties of an accountable ring
signature to our setting. We complete our security model with a new definition
of reporter anonymity for report and trace ring signatures, which ensures that
the reporter is anonymous even after tracing is complete.
We demonstrate feasibility of report and trace by providing a construction of
an R&T ring signature scheme that relies on standard cryptographic primitives
(§3). Briefly, the signer provably encrypts their identity under the tracer’s public
key for a public-key encryption scheme and then encrypts the resulting ciphertext
using a one-time key-pair for a public-key encryption scheme. Additionally, the
signer provably encrypts the one-time decryption key (which we call the reporter
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token) to all potential reporters. Then, the reporter decrypts their token, and the
tracer requires the reporter token to recover the signer’s identity. Our construction
is based on the accountable ring signature of [6] in which the signer provable
encrypts their identity under the tracer’s public key and the tracer can revoke
the signer’s anonymity by decrypting the resulting ciphertext. We choose this
construction due to its efficiency and because its security relies upon standard,
well-understood cryptographic hardness assumptions (namely, the decisional
Diffie-Hellman assumption). We provide a sketch proof that our construction
satisfies our security model. Our full proof of security, which we present in the
full version of this paper [11], relies on standard notions of security for the
cryptographic primitives used in our construction.
We analyse the efficiency of our construction (§3.3), summarising the compu-
tational and communication costs associated with signing, reporting and tracing
for our scheme. We provide an instantiation of our construction (§3.2), which
demonstrates that it can be implemented efficiently. In fact, for the cryptographic
primitives we select, our construction performs favourably to the accountable
ring signature of [6], and the additional cost of reporting is small.
Finally, we extend our construction to support multiple reporters (§4) using
threshold publicly verifiable secret sharing [23]. We provide each potential reporter
with a share of the reporter token, and a threshold of shares are required to
recover the reporter token. We conclude with an efficiency analysis for our multiple
reporter construction.
1.3 Contextualising R&T Ring Signatures
In this paper, we introduce a new primitive, an R&T ring signature, and provide
a way to achieve it. We are also interested in placing this primitive in the context
of related schemes and in highlighting the advantages it brings. We explore this
next and summarise our findings in Table 1.
Revoking Anonymity of the Accused. All primitives with tracing functionality
discussed so far [1, 17, 20, 24, 15, 16, 22, 6, 26] hide the identity of the accused
(i.e., the signer in an R&T ring signature schemes) until tracing is complete, at
which point, anonymity of the accused is revoked. We note that [1, 17, 20, 24]
reveal the identity of the accused only to the tracer. However, for accountable
ring signatures schemes [26, 6], group signature variants [15, 16] and our R&T
ring signature, anonymity of the accused is publicly revoked to allow for public
verification of the tracing process. Accordingly, the tracer is accountable for their
actions and can only (provably) revoke the anonymity of a real accused user.
Entities Revoking Anonymity. Every primitive we consider [1, 17, 20, 24, 15, 16,
22, 6, 26] requires a designated tracer. In some systems, e.g., [1, 17, 26], the tracer
is distributed. Whilst our R&T ring signature construction (§3), and our multiple
reporter construction (§4), model the tracer as a single entity, we remark that
we can also distribute the tracer, thus distributing trust amongst a set of tracers.
Trust in the tracer can be further reduced by requiring a reporter. Our R&T
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ring signature and [24, 1, 17, 20, 22] define a reporter such that the reporter and
tracer must cooperate to revoke anonymity. Additionally, purpose-built tracing
systems [1, 17, 20] require a threshold of reports to trigger the tracing process. We
provide both options: our R&T ring signature construction (§3) requires a single
report; our multiple reporter construction (§4) requires a threshold of reports.
Anonymity of the Reporter. Our (single reporter) R&T scheme ensures that the
reporter is anonymous even after tracing. This is not true of MDO signatures [22],
where the reporter is a fixed, publicly-known, entity. Also, for end-to-end en-
crypted messaging [24], the tracer learns the identity of the reporter before
starting the tracing process. Moreover, purpose-build reporting systems [1, 17, 20]
intentionally reveal the identity of reporters after tracing. Recall that reporting
systems allow reporters to communicate the identity of an accused person (e.g., a
person accused of assault or illegal activity). Therefore, to follow up on allegations,
revealing the reporter’s identity is necessary. As the tracer in our R&T scheme
does not require the identity of the reporter to follow up on an allegation (in fact,
the allegation is that the message signed by the accused is malicious, and the
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Table 1. Contextualising R&T ring signatures. ∗ denotes anonymity only holds until
tracing is complete.
Application. We describe a potential application of report and trace. Consider a
forum platform and a set of registered users that can post messages to the forum.
Users may wish to post messages anonymously, while also providing a signature
proving that they are a registered user. Moreover, if a user posts a malicious
message, the platform may wish to hold the signer accountable. Standard group
and ring signature facilitate the ability of a user to sign a message anonymously.
Furthermore, group signatures and accountable ring signatures balance anonymity
and traceability. However, we believe that R&T ring signatures provide a unique
solution to this scenario. Firstly, R&T ring signatures (and group signatures
with message dependent opening) do not rely solely on a designated tracer to
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revoke anonymity and, as such, provide additional protection for the signer’s
identity above that provided by accountable ring signatures and group signatures.
Moreover, distributing the tracing function reduces the burden on the tracer to
check for malicious messages. Indeed, the tracer need only check messages for
which the tracer receives a report. Additionally, our R&T signature allows the
tracer to revoke anonymity only for the reported signature. That is, the signer
preserves their anonymity with respect to all other signatures and no other signer
who posts the same message will be de-anonymised. In our forum scenario, it may
not be desirable to revoke anonymity for all signatures produced by the signer of
a single malicious message. Moreover, it may be the case that a signed message
is malicious in the context of which it is reported, but may be entirely innocuous
in a different context. Consequently, R&T ring signatures are more appropriate
than traceable signatures or MDO signatures for this setting. Finally, R&T ring
signatures retain the versatility of ring signatures and define the reporter to be
a system user, which can foster a sense of community responsibility for forum
content, and provide a unique guarantee of anonymity for the reporter which can
empower users to report malicious behaviour without fear of repercussions.
2 Syntax and Security
We introduce the syntax of a report and trace (R&T) ring signature scheme
and accompanying security model. In a standard ring signature, users digitally
sign messages with respect to a set of users, known as a ring. Ring signatures
ensure that the signer cannot be identified; any ring member is equally likely to
have produced the signature. R&T ring signatures extend this notion, allowing a
signer to be identified if an anonymous report is made to a designated tracer,
who then traces the signer. Alongside a set of users U , an R&T ring signature
scheme involves the following entities. A reporter produces a report. Within our
syntax and security model, reporters are ring members, though this need not be
the case. A designated tracer, denoted T, revokes the signer’s anonymity if the
tracer received a report for the signature in question. Anybody can verify the
correctness of the report and trace by running a public verification algorithm.
Formally, we define an R&T ring signature in Definition 1.
Definition 1 (R&T ring signature). An R&T ring signature scheme is a tuple
of algorithms (Setup, T.KGen, U.KGen, Sign, Verify, Report, Trace, VerTrace) such
that
– Setup(1λ): On input security parameter 1λ, Setup outputs public parameters
pp.
– T.KGen(pp): On input pp, T.KGen outputs a tracer key pair (pkT, skT). We
write that pkT ← T.KGen(pp; skT).
– U.KGen(pp): On input pp, U.KGen outputs a user key pair (pkU, skU). We
write that pkU ← U.KGen(pp; skU).
– Sign(pp, skU, pkT,m,R): On input pp, skU, pkT, message m and ring R, Sign
outputs a signature σ.
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– Verify(pp, pkT,m,R, σ): On input pp, pkT, m, R and σ, Verify outputs 1 if σ
is a valid signature on m with respect to R, and 0 otherwise.
– Report(pp, pkT, skU,m,R, σ): On input pp, pkT, skU, m, R and σ, Report
outputs a reporter token Rep.
– Trace(pp, skT,m,R, σ, Rep): On input pp, skT, m, R, σ and Rep, Trace outputs
the signer’s identity pkU, auxiliary information Tr consisting of the reporter
token, and a proof of correct trace ρt.
– VerTrace(pp, pkT,m,R, σ, pkU, Tr, ρt): On input pp, pkT, m, R, σ, pkU, Tr
and ρt, VerTrace outputs 1 if the trace is valid, and 0 otherwise.
We define correctness for our syntax as the property that honestly generated
signatures are verifiable.
Definition 2 (Correctness). An R&T ring signature is correct if, for any






for i = 1,...,n : (pkUi ,skUi ) ← U.KGen(pp);
R = {pkU1 ,...,pkUn};
σ ← Sign(pp,skUj ,pkT,m,R);
b ← Verify(pp,pkT,m,R,σ)
: b = 1
 ≥ 1− negl(λ) .
2.1 Security Model
We present a security model for our syntax that incorporates accepted security
properties from the ring signature literature. Firstly, we extend well-established
definitions of anonymity and unforgeability for standard ring signature schemes,
presented in [4], to our setting. Then, we cast the security requirements of an
accountable ring signature into our syntax. Namely, we define traceability, which
captures notions of trace correctness, non-frameability and tracing soundness
defined in [6]. Finally, we present a definition of reporter anonymity, a new
security property for our report and trace setting.
In Figure 1, we define a number of oracles for our security experiments. We
write OX(y1,...,yn)(z1, . . . , zn) to denote oracle X that has access to parameters
and sets y1, . . . , yn and takes as input z1, . . . , zn. Oracles Oreg, Ocorrupt and
Osign operate as expected: they model registration of users, corruption of users,
and signature generation respectively. Moreover, Oreport is called to obtain a
reporter token for a message and Otrace is called to trace the signer of a message.
Our security model considers entities (i.e., users, reporters and tracers) that
are honest, corrupt, or under the attacker’s control. In detail, honest entities
do not provide an attacker with secret keys; corrupt entities generate their keys
honestly, but may later provide the attacker with their secret keys; the attacker
can generate keys on behalf of controlled entities. An attacker with credentials of




Qreg← Qreg ∪ {pkU}
L← L ∪ {(pkU, skU)}
return pkU
Ocorrupt(L,Qcorr)(pkU)
if (pkU, ·) /∈ L return ⊥
Qcorr← Qcorr ∪ {pkU}
return skU
Osign(pp,L,Qsign)(pkU, pkT,m,R)
if (pkU, ·) /∈ L return ⊥
σ ← Sign(pp, skU, pkT,m,R ∪ {pkU})
Qsign← Qsign ∪ {(pkT, pkU,m,R, σ)}
return σ
Oreport(pp,pkT,L,Qreport)(pkU,m,R, σ)
if pkU /∈ R ∨ (pkU, ·) /∈ L return ⊥
Rep← Report(pp, pkT, skU,m,R, σ)
Qreport← Qreport ∪ {(pkU,m,R, σ)}
return Rep
Otrace(pp,skT,Qtrace)(m,R, σ, Rep)
(pkU, Tr, ρt)← Trace(pp, skT,m,R, σ, Rep)
Qtrace← Qtrace ∪ {(m,R, σ)}
return (pkU, Tr, ρt)
Fig. 1: Oracles used in the experiments for anonymity, unforgeability, traceability
and reporter anonymity of an R&T ring signature scheme.
Anonymity. Anonymity is the property that a signature does not reveal the
identity of the signer unless the signature is reported and the signer traced.
Our formal definition of anonymity captures anonymity against adversarially
generated keys as defined in [4]. As such, we assume that the adversary can
corrupt and control users and reporters, but that the tracer is honest. We require
that the adversary, when provided with a challenge signature, cannot determine
which of two potential honest signers generated the signature, on the condition
that the adversary does not obtain a trace for the challenge signature.
Definition 3 (Anonymity). An R&T ring signature is anonymous with respect
to adversarially generated keys if, for any probabilistic, polynomial-time (PPT)




L, Qreg, Qcorr, Qsign, Qreport, Qtrace ← ∅;
(pkT,skT) ← T.KGen(pp);




σ ← Sign(pp,skUb ,pkT,m,R ∪ {pkU0 ,pkU1});
b′ ← AO2 (σ,st)
: b
′ = b ∧ (m,R,σ) /∈ Qtrace
∧ {pkU0 ,pkU1} ⊆ Qreg\Qcorr

≤ 12 + negl(λ)
where O = {Oreg,Ocorrupt,Osign,Oreport,Otrace} are the oracles defined in
Figure 1.
Unforgeability. We require that signatures are unforgeable. That is, an attacker
cannot output a valid signature on behalf of an honest user, even if an attacker
can trace the identity of honest signers through the report and trace functionality.
Formally, we consider an unforgeability definition similar to that presented in [4].
Thus, in our unforgeability experiment, we assume that the adversary controls
the tracer and can corrupt and control users and reporters. We require that the
adversary cannot output a valid signature for a ring of honest users, where the
signature is not the output of the signing oracle.
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Definition 4 (Unforgeability). An R&T ring signature scheme is unforgeable








∧ R ⊆ Qreg\Qcorr
∧ (pkT,·,m,R,σ) /∈ Qsign
]
≤ negl(λ)
where O = {Oreg,Ocorrupt,Osign,Oreport} are the oracles defined in Figure 1.
Traceability. R&T signatures must satisfy traceability. In other words, it must be
possible to identify the signer of a message. Traceability comprises three conditions:
trace correctness, non-frameability and trace soundness. Trace correctness requires
that an honestly generated signature must be traceable to the correct signer.
Accordingly, any trace output by the tracer must be valid. We capture trace
correctness in an experiment that requires an honestly generated report and
trace for an honestly generated signature to verify. Non-frameability states that
a report and trace mechanism cannot identify a non-signer as the signer. To this
end, our non-frameability definition requires that the adversary, with control of
the tracer and a subset of users, cannot output a valid trace such that the trace
identifies a non-signer. Finally, trace soundness, defined in [6], stipulates that
the signer identified by the report and trace mechanism is unique. That is, it
is not possible to verifiably identify two users as the signer of a single message.
The trace soundness definition in [6], which we cast into our syntax, considers
an adversary that controls the tracer and can corrupt and control users and
reporters. Trace soundness requires that the adversary cannot output two valid
traces that identify two different signers for the same message.
Definition 5 (Traceability). An R&T ring signature satisfies traceability if
the following conditions are satisfied:
1. Trace correctness: for any n = poly(λ), j, k ∈ [n] where j 6= k, and message





for i = 1,...,n : (pkUi ,skUi ) ← U.KGen(pp);
R = {pkU1 ,...,pkUn};
σ ← Sign(pp,skUj ,pkT,m,R);
Rep ← Report(pp,pkT,skUk ,m,R,σ);
(pkU,Tr,ρt) ← Trace(pp,skT,m,R,σ,Rep);
b ← VerTrace(pp,pkT,m,R,σ,pkU,Tr,ρt)
: b = 1
 ≥ 1− negl(λ) .









b = 1 ∧ pkU ∈ Qreg\Qcorr
∧ Verify(pp,pkT,m,R,σ) = 1
∧ (pkT,pkU,m,R,σ) /∈ Qsign
]
≤ negl(λ)






L, Qreg, Qcorr, Qsign, Qreport ← ∅;
(pkT,m,R,σ,pkUi ,Tri,ρti ,pkUj ,Trj ,ρtj ) ← A
O(pp)
b1 ← VerTrace(pp,pkT,m,R,σ,pkUi ,Tri,ρti );
b2 ← VerTrace(pp,pkT,m,R,σ,pkUj ,Trj ,ρtj )
:
b1 = 1 ∧ b2 = 1
∧ pkUi 6= pkUj
 ≤ negl(λ)
where O = {Oreg,Ocorrupt,Osign,Oreport} are the oracles defined in Figure 1.
Reporter Anonymity. We define reporter anonymity, a new property that requires
that a report does not reveal the ring member that produced it. We formally
define reporter anonymity as the property that an adversary, when provided
with a report for a signature, cannot determine which of two potential reporters
produced the report. Our definition captures an adversary that can corrupt and
control users and reporters, and controls the tracer. We require that the adversary
does not corrupt either of the potential reporters and does not obtain a report
through access to oracles.
Definition 6 (Reporter anonymity). An R&T ring signature is reporter
anonymous if, for any PPT adversary A = (A1,A2), there exists a negligible




L, Qreg, Qcorr, Qsign, Qreport ← ∅;




Rep ← Report(pp,pkT,skUb ,m,R,σ);
b′ ← AO2 (σ,st)
:
b′ = b
∧{pkU0 ,pkU1} ⊆ (R ∩ Qreg)\Qcorr
∧ (m,R,σ,pkU0 ) /∈ Qreport
∧ (m,R,σ,pkU1 ) /∈ Qreport

≤ 12 + negl(λ)
where O = {Oreg,Ocorrupt,Osign,Oreport} are the oracles defined in Figure 1.
3 A Report and Trace Ring Signature Construction
We present an R&T ring signature construction, formally defined in Figure 2.
Our construction requires a one-way function f : X → Y such that, given
y = f(x), it is hard to compute x, and a standard public key encryption
scheme PKE = (PKE.KGen,PKE.Enc,PKE.Dec) that is secure against chosen
plaintext attacks (IND-CPA) [13]. We require a zero-knowledge proof system
NIZK = (NIZK.Setup,NIZK.Prove,NIZK.Verify) that satisfies completeness, knowl-
edge soundness and zero-knowledge where such security definitions are drawn
from [14]. Finally, we utilise a signature of knowledge SOK = (SoK.Setup,
SoK.Sign,SoK.Verify) [7], that satisfies correctness, simulatability and extractabil-
ity, all of which are defined in [6].
The idea behind our construction is as follows. The tracer and users obtain
a key pair for a PKE scheme. The signer generates a fresh key pair for a PKE
scheme, and the freshly generated decryption key (known as the reporter token
in our construction) is encrypted to all members of the ring using a PKE scheme.
The signer then uses a double layer of encryption to encrypt their public identity,
which is generated via one-way function f . That is, the signer encrypts their
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public identity under the public key of the tracer, and encrypts the resulting
ciphertext under the freshly generated encryption key. In this way, a reporter
and the tracer are required to recover the identity of the signer. Indeed, any ring
member can decrypt the reporter token, and the tracer requires the reporter token,
along with their own decryption key, to remove the double-layer of encryption
and revoke anonymity of the signer. Our construction additionally employs NIZK
proofs and an SOK to ensure that operations are performed correctly, i.e., that
the signer encrypts the correct public identity and reporter token, and that the
reporter and tracer identify the correct signer.
Our construction is similar to the construction in [6], which provides an
efficient accountable ring signature scheme that allows a designated tracer to
revoke signer anonymity. In [6], the signer uses a PKE scheme to encrypt their
public identity under the tracer’s public key, and the tracer recovers the signer’s
identity by decrypting the ciphertext. This construction also relies on an SOK
that allows the signer to prove that they have encrypted a public identity for
which they know a corresponding secret, and a NIZK proof such that the tracer
can prove correct decryption, i.e., that they traced the correct signer. Our R&T
construction differs from [6] in the following way. We require the encryption of
a token to a set of reporters and provide a NIZK proof of correct encryption.
Additionally, we use a double-layer of encryption, which is crucial to ensuring
that the tracer cannot decrypt the signer’s identity without a reporter token.
3.1 Description of Our Construction
We now describe the details of our construction. A trusted third party runs
Setup, performing setup for the PKE, NIZK and SOK schemes. We assume that
the public parameters generated for each scheme defines the public/secret key,
randomness and message spaces (which we denote respectively as PK, SK, Rand
and M) as appropriate. T.KGen generates a tracer key pair for a PKE scheme,
and U.KGen is run to generate user key pairs. In particular, users generate a
signing/verification key pair (pkRS, skRS) using one-way function f , and a key
pair (pkPKE, skPKE) for a PKE scheme.
To sign a message m with respect to a ring R, the signer runs algorithm Sign.
The signer generates a key pair (pkSign, skSign) for a PKE scheme and encrypts the
reporter token skSign to each ring member (i.e., encrypts skSign under the public
encryption key of each ring member). The signer proves that each PKE ciphertext
encrypt the reporter token skSign associated with pkSign, which is included in the
signature. That is, the signer provides a NIZK proof for the following relation:
REnc =
{
(pp,(pkSign,pkPKEi ,c1),(r1,1,...,r1,|R|,skSign)) : pkSign := PKE.KGen(ppPKE;skSign)
∧ {∀ i ∈ 1,...,|R| : c1,i := PKE.Enc(ppPKE,pkPKEi ,skSign;r1,i)}
}
(1)
Then, the signer’s verification key pkRS is encrypted under the tracer’s public key,
resulting in ciphertext c2, which is then encrypted under the freshly generated
public key pkSign, giving ciphertext c3. Finally, the signer produces a signature
of knowledge, which proves that c3 encrypts a verification key in the ring such
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that the signer knows the associated signing key. The signature of knowledge is
associated with the following relation:
RSOK =
{
(pp,(pkT,pkSign,R,c3),(r2,r3,skRS),m) : c3 := PKE.Enc(ppPKE,pkSign,c2;r3)







pp← (ppPKE, ppNIZK, ppSOK)
return pp
T.KGen(pp)








pkU ← (pkRS, pkPKE)
skU ← (skRS, skPKE)
return (pkU, skU)
Sign(pp, skU, pkT,m,R)
parse pp as (ppPKE, ppNIZK, ppSOK) ∧ skU as (skRS, skPKE) ∧R as {(pkRS1 , pkPKE1), . . . , (pkRS|R| , pkPKE|R|)}
pk ← f(skRS); (pkSign, skSign)← PKE.KGen(ppPKE); r1,1, . . . , r1,|R|, r2, r3 ← Rand
for i = 1, . . . , |R| : c1,i ← PKE.Enc(ppPKE, pkPKEi , skSign; r1,i); c1 ← (c1,1, . . . , c1,|R|)
ρ← NIZK.Prove(pp, (pkSign, (pkPKE1 , . . . , pkPKE|R|), c1), (r1,1, . . . , r1,|R|, skSign))
c2 ← PKE.Enc(ppPKE, pkT, pk; r2); c3 ← PKE.Enc(ppPKE, pkSign, c2; r3)
σSOK ← SoK.Sign(pp, (pkT, pkSign, R, c3), (r2, r3, skRS),m)
return σ = (pkSign, c1, c3, ρ, σSOK)
Report(pp, pkT, skU,m,R, σ)
parse pp as (ppPKE, ppNIZK, ppSOK) ∧ skU as (skRS, skPKE) ∧R as {(pkRS1 , pkPKE1), . . . , (pkRS|R| , pkPKE|R|)}
∧ σ as (pkSign, c1, c3, ρ, σSOK) ∧ c1 as (c1,1, . . . , c1,|R|)
if Verify(pp, pkT,m,R, σ) = 0 return 0
for i ∈ 1, . . . , |R| s.t. f(skPKE) = pkPKEi : skSign ← PKE.Dec(ppPKE, skPKE, c1,i)
ρr ← NIZK.Prove(pp, (R, c1, skSign), skPKE)
return Rep = (skSign, ρr)
Trace(pp, skT,m,R, σ, Rep)
parse pp as (ppPKE, ppNIZK, ppSOK) ∧ σ as (pkSign, c1, c3, ρ, σSOK) ∧ Rep as (skSign, ρr)
pkT ← PKE.KGen(ppPKE; skT)
if Verify(pp, pkT,m,R, σ) = 0 return 0
if NIZK.Verify(pp, (R, c1, skSign), skPKE) = 0 return 0
c2 ← PKE.Dec(ppPKE, skSign, c3); pk ← PKE.Dec(ppPKE, skT, c2); ρt ← NIZK.Prove(pp, (pkT, c2, pk), skT)
return (pk, Tr = (c2, Rep), ρt)
Verify(pp, pkT,m,R, σ)
parse pp as (ppPKE, ppNIZK, ppSOK) ∧ σ as (pkSign, c1, c3, ρ, σSOK)
∧R as {(pkRS1 , pkPKE1), . . . , (pkRS|R| , pkPKE|R|)}
if NIZK.Verify(pp, (pkSign, (pkPKE1 , . . . , pkPKE|R|), c1), ρ) = 0 return 0
if SoK.Verify(pp, (pkT, pkSign, R, c3),m, σSOK) = 0 return 0
return 1
VerTrace(pp, pkT,m,R, σ, pk, Tr, ρt)
parse pp as (ppPKE, ppNIZK, ppSOK) ∧ σ as (pkSign, c1, c3, ρ, σSOK)
∧ Tr as (c2, Rep) ∧ Rep as (skSign, ρr)
if NIZK.Verify(pp, (pkT, c2, pk), ρt) = 0 return 0
if NIZK.Verify(pp, (R, c1, skSign), ρr) = 0 return 0
if Verify(pp, pkT,m,R, σ) = 0 return 0
if PKE.Dec(ppPKE, skSign, c3) 6= c2 return 0
return 1
Fig. 2: Our R&T ring signature construction.
To report a message, a ring member runs Report to decrypt the reporter token.
The reporter also provides a proof of correct decryption, without revealing which
member of the ring decrypted the token. This is given by the following relation:
RDecr =
{
(pp,(R,c1,skSign),skPKE) : skSign := PKE.Dec(ppPKE,skPKE,c1,i)
∧ c1,i ∈ c1 ∧ pkPKE := PKE.KGen(ppPKE;skPKE) ∈ R
}
(3)
On receipt of a report, the tracer runs Trace to decrypt ciphertexts c3 and c2
and reveal the signer’s verification key. As skSign is included in the report, anyone
can decrypt c3, hence checking correct decryption directly. As such, the tracer
need only prove correct decryption of c2, which is given by the following relation:
RDect =
{
(pp,(pkT,c2,pkRS),skT) : pk := PKE.Dec(ppPKE,skT,c2)




Our construction additionally provides a public signing verification algorithm
Verify, which ensures that the signer provides an encryption of their own public key,
enabling tracing if the message is malicious. Moreover, a public trace verification
algorithm VerTrace ensures that the correct signer is traced.
We prove that our construction satisfies correctness, anonymity, unforgeability,
traceability and reporter anonymity as defined in Section 2. We obtain Theorem 1,
which we formally prove in [11] and provide a proof sketch here.
Theorem 1. The construction in Figure 2 satisfies correctness, anonymity,
unforgeability, traceability and reporter anonymity as defined in Definitions 2– 6.
Proof (Sketch). Correctness and tracing correctness of our construction follows
trivially from the correctness of the building blocks. Unforgeability follows from
extractability of the SOK and the fact that f is a one-way function. In fact, if
our construction is not unforgeable, the adversary can break the one-wayness of
function f , or can be used to construct an adversary against the extractability
property. To prove non-frameability, we show that, if our construction is not
unforgeable, the adversary can be used to construct an adversary against the
soundness property of the NIZK scheme or the extractability property of the
SOK. Else, the construction does not satisfy unforgeability. Soundness is proven
by showing that, if the construction is not sound, then the adversary can be used
to construct an adversary against the soundness of the NIZK scheme.
To prove anonymity and reporter anonymity, we proceed via a series of game
hops, demonstrating that each hop is indistinguishable to the adversary. Our
final game hop result in a game for which the view of the adversary is identical
for β = 0 and β = 1 and the proof holds. In our anonymity proof, we simulate the
setup and proofs for the NIZK and SOK systems, which is an indistinguishable
game hop if the NIZK scheme satisfies the zero-knowledge property and the SOK
satisfies simulatability. Then, we extract the plaintext from the ciphertexts, rather
than running the decryption algorithm. By the knowledge extractability property
of the NIZK and extractability of the SOK, this hop is also indistinguishable.
Finally, we encrypt the identity of the same signer, regardless of β, which is
indistinguishable by the IND-CPA property of the PKE scheme. Our proof of
reporter anonymity is similar. We simulate the setup and proofs for the NIZK
proof system and then extract the plaintext from the ciphertexts, rather than
running the decryption algorithm when generating a reporter token. These game
hops are indistinguishable if the NIZK scheme satisfies the zero-knowledge and
knowledge extractability properties.
3.2 Instantiating Our Construction
We instantiate our construction with ElGamal encryption and the signature of
knowledge of [6], modified to account for the double layer of encryption of the
signer’s identity. Additionally, we instantiate our NIZK protocols for signing,
reporting and tracing with various Σ-protocols. For our choice of primitives, our
instantiation is secure. We provide full details of our instantiation and a sketch
proof of its security in [11]. Here, we present an overview of our instantiation.
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Setup and Key Generation. We let ppPKE = ppNIZK = (G, g, q) where G is a cyclic
group of order q with generator g. Moreover, ppSOK = (ek, ck) where ek is an
ElGamal encryption key and ck is a key for a commitment scheme. We define
one-way function f to perform group exponentiation such that f(x) = gx for
some x ∈ Zq. We write pp = (ppPKE, ppSOK) as the output of algorithm Setup.
We write the key pair for the tracer as (pkT = g
skT , skT) and the key pair for the
user as (pkU, skU) = ((g
skRS , gskPKE), (skRS, skPKE)) where skT, skRS, skPKE ∈ Zq.
Sign. We use a standard ElGamal encryption scheme to generate ciphertext
c1 and to double-encrypt the signer’s identity in algorithm Sign. That is, we
define ciphertexts c2 = (A2, B2) = (g
r2 , pkr2T · pk) and c3 = (A2, A3, B3) =
(gr2 , gr3 , pkr3Sign · pk
r2
T · pk). To generate proof ρ for the relation in Equation 1,
we use the Σ-protocol of [23], which shows that c1 encrypts the discrete log
of a public element pkSign and can be transformed into a NIZK proof using the
Fiat-Shamir transform [10]. Finally, we modify the SOK of [6] to generate σSOK,
which proves that the signer knows skRS such that pkRS = g
skRS is an element
of the ring. Our modification accounts for the double-layer of encryption used
in our construction, rather than the single ElGamal encryption required in the
accountable ring signature construction of [6].
Report and Trace. The reporter runs PKE.Dec to generate skSign. For our instan-
tiation, the reporter need not generate a proof of knowledge of correct decryption
for the relation in Equation 3. In fact, as G is a cyclic group, gi = gj if i = j
mod q. Therefore, pkSign is uniquely defined by g
skSign . The tracer (and any public
verifier) can trivially check correct decryption of the reporter token by computing
a single group exponentiation, i.e., check gskSign = pkSign where skSign is returned
by the reporter and pkSign is included in the signature. The tracer decrypts the




3 ) for c3 = (A2, A3, B3). The tracer
proves correct decryption of c2 using a standard Σ-protocol as in [6].
3.3 Efficiency of Our Construction
Here, we discuss the efficiency of our construction, showing that it incurs rea-
sonable costs with respect to the functionality provided and that our proposed
instantiation is practical. We also highlight the additional costs associated with
our report and trace functionality by comparing with the accountable ring signa-
ture in [6]. We show that our construction compares favourably to the accountable
ring signature construction of [6]: we require additional computation, but these
computations are minimal considering the extra functionality provided by our
R&T construction. We summarise the computation and communication costs of
our generic construction and instantiation in Tables 2 and 3, respectively. We
now briefly describe the costs incurred by the signer, reporter, tracer and verifier.
Signer. The signer’s computation costs are dominated by the SOK and PKE
computations, both of which grow linearly in the size of the ring. In comparison
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1 token skSign
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2 NIZK proof (dec)
1 pk of signer
t sub-tokens s1, . . . , st
1 PKE ciphertext
2 NIZK proof (dec)
VerTrace
Comp.
1 NIZK.Verify (dec) 2 NIZK.Verify (PKE dec)
1 PKE.Dec
t+ 1 NIZK.Verify (dec)
1 PKE.Dec
1 SS.Combine
Comm. N/A N/A N/A
Table 2. Computation (comp.) and communication (comm.) costs of generic construc-
tions. We write (enc) and (dec) to indicate a proof of correct encryption or decryption
respectively. For our multiple reporters construction, we provide costs relative to a ring
of size |R| and a threshold of t.
doubles the computation costs for the signer. Moreover, the size of the signature
also increases, requiring the communication of a number of group and field
elements that grow linearly in the size of the ring (whereas the accountable ring
signature communicates a constant number of group elements).
Reporter. The computation and communication costs incurred by the reporter,
which is unique to our construction, are minimal. In fact, for our instantiation,
the reporter need only perform a single decryption (i.e., 1 group exponentiation)
and a report consists of a single field element. This demonstrates that, though
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Comm. 14G + (|R|+ 7)Zq (3|R|+ 19)G + (2|R|+ 7)Zq
Verify











Table 3. Computation (comp.) and communication (comm.) costs of instantiations.
We present costs relative to a ring of size |R|. Our computation costs are given in terms
of the number of group exponentiations required, and our communication costs are
presented in terms of the number of group elements from G and field elements from Zq.
using cyclic group operations, it is possible to provide an efficient instantiation
in which the computation costs of the reporter are minimised.
Tracer. The tracer’s costs are small and compare favourably to accountable
ring signatures. Indeed, computation of the trace requires a constant number
of group exponentiations, calling for only 2 additional group exponentiation
when compared to accountable ring signatures. In particular, to verify correct
decryption of the reporter token, the tracer need only perform a single group
exponentiation, rather than verifying a NIZK proof (cf. §3.2). Furthermore, the
size of a trace is constant and requires only 1 extra field element and 2 extra
group elements, when compared to accountable ring signatures.
Verifier. As for signature generation, signature verification costs are dominated
by the SOK and PKE scheme. Specifically, our PKE computations require compu-
tation costs similar to those required to verify the SOK, which means verification
of an R&T ring signature incurs double the computational costs of an accountable
ring signature. On the other hand, verification of the trace requires only 6 group
exponentiations, only 2 more than accountable ring signatures.
Potential Efficiency Improvements. Our instantiation builds upon the accountable
ring signature of [6] but techniques from group signature literature (e.g., [15, 16,
22]) could be used to provide a more efficient construction. We opt to build upon
the construction of [6] to clearly demonstrate the additional costs associated with
reporting. Indeed, our instantiation presents worst-case efficiency results and can
perform reasonably for a small ring.
Our instantiation could use a broadcast encryption (BE) scheme [9] to encrypt
the reporter token to all members of the ring. Potentially, by using a BE scheme
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that is based on bilinear maps (as, for example, [5] and subsequent works), our
costs would be similar to those of the accountable ring signature construction [6].
Our reasons for not following this approach are twofold. First, in contrast with BE
schemes based on bilinear maps, our construction does not require an interactive
key generation protocol. Accordingly, our instantiation retains the benefit of
ring signatures with respect to non-interactive key generation. Second, NIZK
proofs of correct encryption for schemes based on bilinear maps are currently
unknown [19]. Our construction, on the other hand, requires Σ-protocols to prove
correct encryption and decryption of the reporter token. Moreover, by relying on
cyclic groups, our instantiation does not require a proof of correct decryption for
the reporter token, and the tracer can efficiently verify correct decryption.
We note two further modifications that lead to a more efficient, yet more
limited, protocol. Firstly, during setup, the signer could choose a static set of
possible reporters that share a secret key for a PKE scheme. Then, the reporter
share is encrypted under the corresponding public key. Though this approach
is more efficient, we opt to allow the signer to dynamically choose the reporter
set, fostering a sense of user empowerment and capturing the functionality of
a user posting entries in different fora. Secondly, if reporter anonymity is not a
concern and a proof of correct decryption is required by the reporter, the reporter
can produce a proof that indicates which reporter decrypted the token, which
would decrease the computation costs incurred by the reporter. However, we
opt to provide a construction that meets a strong security model, ensuring that
reporters can produce reports without the concern of their identity being leaked.
4 Extending R&T to Multiple Reporters
In our construction, we assume that the reporter and tracer do not collude and,
hence, if a reported message is not malicious, the tracer does not reveal the
identity of the signer. We can further mitigate against a malicious reporter by
requiring that the tracer receive multiple reports to trigger the tracing process.
We describe an extension of our construction to multiple reporters that requires
a (t, n)-publicly verifiable secret sharing scheme PVSS = (SS.Gen,SS.Verify,
SS.Combine), with syntax drawn from [23], where n = |R| is the size of the
ring and t is the number of shares required to reconstruct the secret. The PVSS
scheme is used to generate |R| shares of the reporter token, i.e., reporter token
s = (s1, . . . , s|R|). Each share is encrypted under a ring member’s public key for
a PKE scheme, rather than encrypting a single reporter token to all members of
the ring. This extension requires minimal changes to our construction, which we
outline here.
To sign a message, the signer uses the PVSS scheme to produce |R| reporter
sub-tokens. Each sub-token si is encrypted under the public key of a ring member
and accompanied with a NIZK proof of correct encryption and a public version of
the sub-token, Si. For clarity, we outline the changes to the signing algorithm in
Figure 3. As before, our construction provides public verification algorithm Verify,
which additionally requires that the verifier run algorithm SS.Verify to verify
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Sign(pp, skU, pkT,m,R)
parse pp as (ppPKE, ppNIZK, ppSOK) ∧ skU as (skRS, skPKE)
∧R as {(pkRS1 , pkPKE1), . . . , (pkRS|R| , pkPKE|R|)}
pk ← f(skRS); s← SK; r1,1, . . . , r1,|R|, r2, r3 ← Rand
({s1, . . . , s|R|}, {S1, . . . , S|R|}, S)← SS.Gen(s, t, |R|)
for i = 1, . . . , |R|
c1,i ← PKE.Enc(ppPKE, pkPKEi , si; r1,i)
ρi ← NIZK.Prove(pp, (Si, pkPKEi , c1,i), (r1,i, si)); Sharei ← (Si, c1,i, ρ1,i)
c2 ← PKE.Enc(ppPKE, pkT, pk; r2); c3 ← PKE.Enc(ppPKE, S, c2; r3)
σSOK ← SoK.Sign(pp, (pkT, S,R, c3), (r2, r3, skRS),m)
return σ = (S, (Share1, . . . , Share|R|), c3, σSOK)
Fig. 3: Algorithm Sign for our construction with multiple reporters.
the secret sharing operations. A ring member reports a message by decrypting
their sub-token and sending the sub-token to the tracer, accompanied with a
proof of correct decryption. Once the tracer has received a threshold number of
sub-tokens, the tracer runs algorithm SS.Combine to recover the reporter token,
then decrypts the signer’s identity as per the original construction.
Anonymity of Reporters. In our multiple reporter construction, each reporter
produces a unique sub-token, and public versions of each sub-token are published
to verify correctness of the PVSS scheme. In this way, when a reporter produces
a report, i.e., their sub-token, anyone can check which share (denoted Share)
this belongs to. Thus, it is possible to determine the reporter’s identity. For
this reason, reporter sub-tokens should be treated carefully by the tracer before
tracing. That is, the sub-tokens should not be revealed by the tracer until tracing
is completed. In this way, the identities of reporters are known to the tracer
before tracing but are not made public until after tracing.
Efficiency of Multiple Reporters. Our construction with multiple reporters is
less efficient than our generic construction with a single reporter, where the
communication and computation costs are outlined in Table 2. Specifically,
producing a signature requires the additional computation and communication
of |R| reporter sub-tokens, and the computation and communication costs of the
tracer grow linearly in the size of the threshold. Moreover, the computation costs
associated with signature and trace verification grow linearly in the size of the ring
and threshold, respectively. However, these costs can be minimised. In particular,
secret share generation and combination, for efficient PVSS schemes (e.g., [23]),
simply requires the computation of group exponentiations and the addition of
field elements respectively [23]. Additionally, the NIZK proofs associated with
these extra costs can be instantiated with efficient primitives, as in our single
reporter construction. That being said, we note that the size and computation
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costs of a report are identical to our single reporter construction, consisting of a
single reporter sub-token, and requiring a single decryption of a PKE ciphertext.
5 Conclusion
We introduced and defined report and trace ring signatures, and presented an
accompanying security model. We presented an R&T ring signature construction
that satisfies our security model, and extended our construction to the multiple
reporter setting. Additionally, we provided an instantiation of our single reporter
construction and compared its efficiency with accountable ring signatures [6],
demonstrating the additional costs associated with our report and trace func-
tionality, and showing that our proposed instantiation is practical. Though our
construction can be efficiently instantiated, the costs incurred by the signer and
the verifier grow linearly in the size of the ring. An interesting area of future
research is to define an efficient, yet (efficiently) verifiable, broadcast encryption
scheme that can be used to instantiate our construction. Moreover, our multiple
reporter setting could be formalised by extending our existing security model to
capture multiple reporters.
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